mirrored image from https://66.media.tumblr.com/618b72ce714a2ca4a56b6564f16dd8dc/tumblr_naou9xZ5My1qzoybuo1_640.jpg without alt text, sorry
Figure 1. mirrored image from https://66.media.tumblr.com/618b72ce714a2ca4a56b6564f16dd8dc/tumblr_naou9xZ5My1qzoybuo1_640.jpg without alt text, sorry.

These bottles of ginger ale were the exact same size when fermentation started Sunday. on Flickr.

August 21st, 2014 8:13pm

Posted on Tumblr over 11 years ago and archived here at /tumblr/2014/08/21/these-bottles-of-ginger-ale-were-the-exact-same/ in the Tumblr collection.
Proximate posts in the Tumblr collection
newer nevver: Modern toss 22 August 2014
this post These bottles of ginger ale were the exact same size when fermentation started Sunday. on Flickr. 22 August 2014
older httpshaming: Evernote checks for update over unencrypted HTTP, and the update packages are also downloaded over HTTP. But it’s signed code, right? What could go wrong? It’s trivially easy to perform a man-in-the-middle attack to prevent future updates from ever being received, or to redirect the user to unsigned or malicious code, that may or may not run. There is a DSA signature on the file at the update URL, and there’s signatures on the files and a certificate OU deep within the app contents… but that all assumes the user can get to the update, and download it securely. Good news for persistent threats, bad news for the millions of Evernote users who want to get critical security updates. This looks easy enough to fix.   (Submitted by Phillip Knoll) 19 August 2014
Proximate posts in the General collection
newer Twitter post from August 22, 2014, 502655794018811904 22 August 2014
this post These bottles of ginger ale were the exact same size when fermentation started Sunday. on Flickr. 22 August 2014
older Twitter post from August 22, 2014, 502654676186460160 22 August 2014